Iran tells US there is no military solution to Middle East war

TEHRAN – Iran’s top diplomat insisted on Sunday that there would be no military solution to the United States’ war against the Islamic republic, with talks on ending the conflict apparently at an impasse. A campaign of heavy bombardment failed to bring a decisive close to the war launched by the US and Israel in late February, and Washington in recent weeks has dialled back military operations in favour of economic pressure.

The main point of contention remains Iran’s attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a vital conduit for Gulf oil and gas where a UK maritime agency reported on Sunday another tanker struck by an unknown projectile. “If our enemies again choose the path of military confrontation, our response will be stronger than before, and we will defend ourselves with even more force,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said at a gathering of foreign ambassadors.

“There is no military solution, nor any solution based on new sanctions,” he continued, adding “only negotiations based on justice and fairness” could end the conflict. The two sides agreed a memorandum of understanding in June that spelled out a framework for a permanent resolution, but Iranian attacks on vessels in the Hormuz prompted a return to US military operations.

Iran has sought to impose its control over the vital shipping lane since the start of the war, striking vessels that attempt to transit without its authorisation. The US has imposed its own counterblockade of Iranian ports, and has also struck vessels it accuses of violating it.

On Sunday, the British maritime security agency UKMTO said a tanker in the Hormuz “reported being struck by an unknown projectile, causing damage to the engine room”, though the crew were reported safe and no environmental impact was recorded. The agency did not specify the date of the incident, the vessel’s origin or destination, or whether it was an oil tanker or LNG carrier.

Iranian and US officials last week held indirect talks on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, with Tehran saying it presented seven conditions for reopening the strait. Iran has demanded, among other things, a ceasefire across the Middle East, the unfreezing of its assets abroad, the lifting of sanctions on its oil sector and an end to the US naval blockade.

Trump, however, rejected the proposal, while leaving the door open both to further talks or renewed military operations. Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Sunday characterised the latest US counterproposal as being “in line with their previous proposals concerning nuclear issues”.

“We have clearly indicated that we are focusing on the issue of the Strait of Hormuz,” he said, adding that reopening the waterway required “an end to the disruptions to Iranian commercial maritime traffic and the lifting of sanctions”.

The United States and Israel have characterised the war as being necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons — a goal it has long denied pursuing — though the focus soon shifted to reopening the Hormuz after its closure sent shockwaves through world energy markets. The United States has not struck Iran since September 1, but it has recently pursued a fresh military buildup in the region.

US media outlet Axios reported that Washington has deployed additional Patriot missile batteries to Saudi Arabia and Qatar to help protect key energy facilities from possible Iranian retaliation. It also reported that the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier and its strike group were heading to the Middle East, where they could join two other US carrier strike groups already in the region.

Axios reported that top Trump cabinet members met Friday to discuss the war in Iran, as well as the conflict in Yemen, where the Tehran-backed Houthis have been fighting government forces and attacking Saudi Arabia.

 




Why Bangladesh must reconsider its trade agreement with the US

M.G. Quibria: Some trade deals are negotiated. Others are simply accepted. Bangladesh’s Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) with the United States, signed in the last frantic days of an interim government, looks unmistakably like the second kind. And seven months later, Dhaka is still making commitments under a bargain whose legal foundations have crumbled twice.

An old grievance, formalised

The programme that produced it began on April 2, 2025, when President Trump unveiled what his administration called “Liberation Day”: country-by-country tariffs calculated using a formula publicly associated with trade adviser Peter Navarro and built around each nation’s trade surplus with the United States. According to Regime Change, the 2026 book by New York Times reporters Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, when the President found the competing economic estimates from Navarro, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick unsatisfying, he turned to aide Natalie Harp to produce numbers closer to what he already intuitively believed, undercutting any claim to scientific rigour in how the tariff rates presented on Liberation Day were determined. Indeed, the President’s instinct behind the policy was long-standing. In a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Boston Globe on September 2, 1987, Trump argued that America’s allies were free-riding on US trade and defence policy and ought to pay for it. Thirty-nine years later, the same argument animates the reciprocal tariff programme.

Out of that programme came the ART, the bilateral instrument Washington has used to reset tariff terms one country at a time. Partners could be classified into five rough groups: first, nations with a fully signed ART; second, nations with only a framework, still under negotiation; third, nations offered bespoke “strategic trade and investment” arrangements, such as Korea and Japan, instead of a standard treaty; fourth, Gulf states substituting investment pledges for any treaty; and fifth, nations where talks have broken down into open disputes. As of this writing, of the ten countries that have actually signed the ART, Bangladesh’s agreement has the strongest claim to being the most one-sided. Not because any single clause is exotic; most of its mechanisms exist, in some form, in some other countries’ agreements too. It is the aggregate, how the obligations stack up and the peculiar circumstances under which Dhaka signed at all, that sets it apart.

The ground shifts twice

The legal scaffolding beneath the tariff side of the ART programme has meanwhile been dismantled and rebuilt twice. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) never authorised a president to impose tariffs at all, striking down the Liberation Day regime in its entirety, including the country-specific caps individual ARTs had negotiated. Within days, the administration invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to address a serious balance-of-payments crisis and imposed a flat 10% global surcharge, a stopgap capped by statute at 150 days. That, too, expired on schedule on July 24, 2026, and was replaced, without a day’s gap in collections, by new Section 301 tariffs targeting inadequate enforcement of forced-labour import bans, set at 10% or 12.5% across sixty economies. A second Section 301 investigation, aimed at resetting rates based on “excess manufacturing capacity” across sixteen economies, including China and Vietnam, remains unresolved months past its own informal deadline, with its statutory window stretching into March 2027. Bangladesh, notably, is featured in both investigations.

Through all of this, the underlying non-tariff commitments inside the ARTs, including investment pledges, forced-labour provisions and standards recognition, have proven sturdier than the tariffs themselves, surviving as separate memoranda even as the specific rate attached to each deal was rebuilt from scratch: first under IEEPA, then Section 122, then Section 301. Against this backdrop of a legal foundation that keeps giving way, Bangladesh’s bargain has to be understood.

A deal nobody can quite explain

The first puzzle is why, among South Asian nations, Bangladesh rushed to sign first. Looking back, it’s hard to identify what that haste bought. If the goal was to lock in better terms than a slower negotiation might yield, the text doesn’t bear that out. Its neighbours all declined to sign anything resembling a full ART and appear none the worse for their caution. Pakistan and Sri Lanka remain in active, unhurried negotiations, without conceding Bangladesh’s terms. India operates under its own separate interim framework, despite being in the crosshairs of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, which targets purchasers of discounted Russian oil and gas. More tellingly, Vietnam and the Philippines, both of which export far more to the United States and run considerably larger trade surpluses than Bangladesh, have signed no comparable agreement at all. If exposure to American tariff pressure were the deciding factor, those are the economies that should have moved first. Instead, it was Bangladesh, with lower exports and a smaller trade surplus, that signed the most sweeping and asymmetric text of the ten.

Signed by a government on its way out

Compounding the puzzle is the timing. Bangladesh signed its ART on February 9, 2026, under the outgoing interim administration of Dr Muhammad Yunus, three days before a national election that would replace it. No elected parliament debated or approved it before it was signed, and the new one has not scrutinised it since taking office. No one has clearly explained what economic or political calculus persuaded an interim government to lock in an open-ended trade relationship on its way out the door. Critics are right to call this what it is: a lame-duck administration locking its successors into commitments the country never had a chance to vote on. That charge doesn’t apply to the other signatories, whose governments actually had a mandate to sign.

A textual imbalance without precedent

The imbalance is visible even in the drafting. One textual count in the Bangladeshi press noted that the ART uses 179 instances of the mandatory “shall”, most of which are attached to Bangladeshi commitments. Such counts are an imperfect measure of substantive burden, but the broader text leaves little doubt about the direction of the obligations: Bangladesh promises considerably more than Washington does. No comparable analysis has been published for the other ARTs, so this is suggestive rather than a verified ranking.

The harshest penalty on the highest starting tariff

An analysis by the non-partisan think tank Peterson Institute for International Economics concludes that these ART deals were “built to push America’s trade partners away from China”. Bangladesh’s agreement carries a non-market-economy clause, foreclosing new trade deals with countries the US designates as non-market economies, including China, Russia, Vietnam, Belarus and others, on pain of snapback tariffs. For Bangladesh, the non-market clause sits in the same maximum-severity tier as five other agreements, including Cambodia’s and Guatemala’s. What is unusual is what is riding on it: Bangladesh’s original “Liberation Day” tariff was 37%, among the highest of any ART signatory, so a snapback would cost Dhaka more than almost any peer. It is, in effect, the same gun pointed at everyone, but loaded heaviest for Dhaka.

Reaching beyond tariffs

The agreement’s obligations extend well beyond market access, reaching into Bangladesh’s regulatory discretion, digital governance, procurement behaviour and its future room to manoeuvre with third countries. Its specific commitments include not contesting US export-tax rebates at the WTO and not applying VAT measures that discriminate against US goods. None of these mechanisms, taken individually, is exotic; versions appear in some other cases. What makes Bangladesh’s case distinctive is the accumulation: a documented obligation imbalance without precedent, one of the highest snapback tariffs in the group and a signing process with no democratic mandate. Whether that combination makes it objectively “the worst” of the ten ARTs is a matter of interpretation.

An exchange that keeps getting more unequal

Post-signing developments have widened the imbalance, not narrowed it. Dhaka has kept expanding its Boeing commitments in a confusing sequence. Bangladesh raised its planned Boeing purchase from 14 to 25 aircraft in July 2025. Yet, on April 30, 2026, Biman Bangladesh Airlines formally ordered 14 jets, its largest-ever order, valued at about $3.7 billion. Then, on August 30, US envoy Sergio Gor announced that Bangladesh had committed “billions of dollars” to buy still more Boeing aircraft, “significantly increasing” its initial order, without identifying the number, models, price or contractual status of the additional planes. The next day, President Trump disclosed that Prime Minister Tarique Rahman had written to him concerning a Boeing purchase. Trump thanked Rahman for his “decision of purchase”, adding, “Boeing will not let you down, and I will not forget.” Yet Bangladeshi officials subsequently said that no separate agreement beyond Biman’s 14-aircraft order had been signed. What additional purchase Trump was thanking Rahman for, and whether it represents a firm contract, a political commitment or merely an intention to buy more aircraft, therefore remains publicly unclear.

The contrast with Indonesia is instructive. Garuda Indonesia, negotiating a comparable Boeing commitment under its own ART, had still not signed a binding contract as of late 2026, while Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund warned that deliveries could take up to seven years, given Boeing’s production backlog and unresolved financing questions. The Strategic Trade and Investment deals with Japan and Korea have been so large that the Wall Street Journal argues they will never materialise. The same uncertainty has been flagged with respect to the Gulf countries.

Bangladesh, by comparison, has moved faster and further, committing to more while securing less in return, even as its underlying agreement is, by most measures, the most lopsided of the treaties.

What makes the speed more striking still is what the process appears to have skipped over. Biman is, by its own numbers, in no position for a $3.7 billion wager: it loses money on most of its international routes, carries more than Tk 6,000 crore in unpaid dues to the Civil Aviation Authority and has turned a profit in only a few years of its existence. It is, in other words, a loss-making carrier committing to its largest-ever purchase on a timetable set by the seller and the geopolitics of a trade dispute, not by any internal business logic. A capital commitment of this magnitude would ordinarily trigger commensurate due diligence, including board-level risk assessment, fleet-financing review and route-profitability modelling. There is no evidence that any of this happened.

The pattern repeats in energy. On August 12, 2026, Bangladesh’s cabinet cleared a twelve-year liquefied natural gas deal with Gunvor USA covering 117 cargoes, roughly 7.5 million tonnes, through 2038. The contract was awarded without competitive bidding, through an unusual state-to-state pricing formula negotiated with a private trading firm, and the government has defended it as prudent hedging against Qatar’s own difficulties in meeting its LNG commitments amid regional tensions.

Meanwhile, the reciprocal side of the bargain remains thin to the point of translucence. Bangladesh’s garment sector, which accounts for more than 85% of everything the country exports to the United States, now faces a real cumulative burden considerably higher than the headline figures suggest: the 10% Section 301 forced-labour duty stacks on top of an existing 15.6% MFN tariff on apparel, pushing the effective rate into the mid-20% range. In exchange, the US commitment on garments, under Article 5.3 of the agreement, remains only a promise to “establish a mechanism” for zero-tariff access tied to US-origin cotton and fibre, with no volume guarantees or deadline. Bangladesh is executing binding, multi-billion-dollar purchase commitments in real time against a promise that, more than half a year after signing, remains entirely undrawn and vague.

A legal irony, and a democratic one

There is further legal ambiguity. The agreement contemplated domestic procedures before entry into force, and Washington’s February announcement explicitly said those procedures remained to be completed. The striking point, therefore, is not that the ART “does not exist”. It is that Dhaka has acted with more certainty than the underlying tariff regime warrants. Aircraft orders, LNG contracts and purchase pledges are all proceeding on schedule against a treaty that, strictly speaking, does not yet exist. The irony compounds: the agreement’s own snapback clause authorises Washington to reimpose tariffs under Executive Order 14257 if Bangladesh defaults, but the Supreme Court has already struck that order down, and neither government has said what replaces it. Dhaka, in effect, is honouring the letter of a contract with no legal force, enforced by a threat that no longer exists.

A second irony is more political than legal. Bangladesh, as of this year, has once again emerged as a democracy. One might expect a vigorous parliamentary reckoning with a sweeping, open-ended trade deal signed by an outgoing, unelected administration. Dhaka also inherited a clear opening to ask whether the bargain still made sense once the legal foundation of Washington’s original tariff threat collapsed. Instead, the commitments have continued and may be expanding. The mystery is no longer why Bangladesh signed such a deal. It is why, having gained both the democratic authority and the legal opening to reconsider it, Dhaka appears so reluctant to use either.

Dr M.G. Quibria is an economist and public policy commentator whose work explores trade, development, governance and democratic change in Bangladesh and beyond. He can be reached at mgquibria.morgan@gmail.com.




U.S. Immigration Policy Tightens: What Should Bangladeshis Do?

Orpi Ahmed: For Bangladeshis living in the United States, immigration policy is no longer an issue limited to lawyers or immigration experts. It is an important reality for families, workers, business owners, students, new immigrants and Bangladeshis planning to come to the United States in the future. In recent times, the U.S. immigration system has shown a clear trend toward stricter enforcement, increased scrutiny and stronger emphasis on immigration law enforcement. As a result, Bangladeshi expatriates now need to be more aware, cautious and committed to complying with the law than ever before.

At the beginning of 2026, the U.S. Department of State temporarily suspended the issuance of immigrant visas to nationals of 75 countries, including Bangladesh. However, on August 21, 2026, a federal court in New York declared the policy unlawful. According to the current information from the Department of State, the suspension is no longer in effect following the court order. At the same time, the department has indicated that the financial self-sufficiency of immigrants and the likelihood of their reliance on U.S. public benefits are receiving greater scrutiny.

This means there is no reason to assume that everything has returned completely to normal. Rather, immigration applications may face greater scrutiny regarding documentation, financial capacity, applicant information and overall eligibility.

In this reality, the first responsibility of Bangladeshi expatriates is to have a clear understanding of their immigration status. They should know whether they are lawful permanent residents, whether they are in the United States on valid employment visas, when their visas or other immigration documents expire, whether an application is pending, and whether they have any matter before an immigration authority or court.

Many immigrants who have lived in the United States for years may begin to take their status for granted. But even a minor mistake under immigration law can sometimes lead to serious consequences. Therefore, it is important to regularly check the validity and status of visas, green cards, employment authorization, applications, court documents and other important records.

The second important issue is to avoid providing false or inaccurate information on any immigration application or government form. Intentionally withholding information, providing a false address, using fraudulent documents or submitting inconsistent information can create serious legal problems in the future.

In an era of social media and extensive online communication, inconsistencies between information provided by an applicant in different places can also raise questions. Therefore, before submitting any application, all information should be carefully reviewed and verified. Where necessary, applicants should seek advice from a qualified immigration attorney.

The third issue is the need to remain cautious about misleading advice. Many Bangladeshi expatriates obtain immigration-related information from friends, social media or unlicensed advisers. But U.S. immigration law is highly complex and changes frequently. A strategy that works in one person’s case does not necessarily apply to another person’s circumstances.

Therefore, before making an important immigration decision, it is advisable to consult a qualified immigration attorney or a recognized legal assistance organization. This is particularly important in cases involving detention, removal notices, court proceedings, asylum applications, green-card issues or citizenship matters.

There is also growing concern over detention and deportation. In a recent case, the United States used for the first time a special “Alien Terrorist Removal Court,” established many years ago but never previously used, to deport an Afghan lawful permanent resident. The case was not a specific action against Bangladeshis, but it demonstrates how seriously U.S. authorities are approaching immigration enforcement.

At the same time, U.S. courts are also defining the limits of various immigration policies adopted by the administration. Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a policy requiring certain immigrants to be detained without bond hearings was unlawful. With federal courts taking differing positions on immigration detention policies, some issues could eventually reach the Supreme Court.

This means that while immigration enforcement is becoming stricter, awareness of legal rights is equally important. If a Bangladeshi expatriate comes into contact with immigration authorities, they should not make decisions out of fear or panic. They should have a basic understanding of their legal status, rights and the procedures that may apply to their situation.

Families also need to be prepared. Particularly in families where the immigration status of a parent or guardian is uncertain, important documents, children’s school and health information, and emergency contact details should be kept in a secure and accessible place. Family members should also know whom to contact in an emergency.

Employment-related matters require caution as well. Individuals holding employment-based visas should comply with the terms of their visas, employment authorization requirements and applicable rules governing their employment. Before changing jobs, changing locations or making any major employment-related decision, they should make sure they understand the relevant immigration requirements.

Similarly, those who wish to apply for U.S. citizenship after obtaining permanent residence should prepare carefully for the naturalization process. Citizenship is not merely a status or privilege; it also involves long-term legal and civic responsibilities. Applicants should therefore make sure their immigration history, tax-related matters and required documents are in order before applying.

Another major responsibility for the Bangladeshi community is to promote awareness about reliable information. Immigration-related rumors can spread rapidly. People should not assume that everything they see on social media is true. Official information from the U.S. Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and the courts should be given priority.

During periods of immigration-policy changes, exaggerated claims such as “all Bangladeshis will be deported,” “all visas have been suspended” or “everyone will be arrested under the new rules” can spread quickly. Such rumors do more than create fear; they can sometimes lead people to make harmful legal decisions.

Bangladeshi organizations, community leaders, mosques, social institutions and the media can also play an important role in this regard. Regular awareness programs on immigration law, dissemination of reliable information and guidance on where to obtain legitimate legal assistance can help protect the community from misinformation.

Most importantly, Bangladeshis living in the United States need to remember that complying with the law and knowing one’s rights are equally important. It is not enough to be aware of tougher enforcement. People must also understand their legal protections and what steps they should take when facing an immigration-related issue.

Under the current circumstances, several matters are particularly important for Bangladeshi expatriates: regularly reviewing their immigration status; keeping track of the expiration dates of important documents; providing accurate information on government forms; fulfilling tax and other legal obligations; never ignoring an official notice or court document; and seeking assistance from a qualified immigration attorney when necessary.

Another point deserves particular emphasis: awareness, not fear, is the strongest form of protection. It is wrong to make rushed decisions out of panic simply because immigration enforcement is becoming stricter. At the same time, it would be equally unwise to underestimate the changing situation.

The Bangladeshi community in the United States is now an important and established community. Its economic contributions, businesses, professional achievements and social engagement continue to grow. Therefore, creating greater awareness of immigration policies and legal rights among Bangladeshis is not merely an individual responsibility; it is a matter of concern for the entire community.

Ultimately, U.S. immigration policy is constantly evolving, and every policy decision does not apply to everyone in the same way. One person’s experience cannot determine another person’s future. Therefore, rather than rumors, rely on official information; rather than assumptions, seek legal advice; and rather than fear, prepare.

At a time of increasingly strict immigration enforcement, the safest approach is to understand the law, comply with it and seek appropriate legal assistance when necessary. For every Bangladeshi living in the United States, the most important responsibility now is to remain informed about their own and their family’s immigration status and to take prompt and appropriate action whenever circumstances change.

— Journalist, Elmhurst, New York




U.S. Strikes 3 Iranian Oil Tankers After Missile Attacks on Navy Ships

WASHINGTON — The United States military said Saturday that it struck three Iranian crude-oil tankers after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched ballistic missiles toward two U.S. Navy warships operating in the region. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said a U.S. aircraft carrier and a guided-missile destroyer successfully evaded multiple Iranian attacks. No American personnel were injured, according to the command.

CENTCOM said U.S. forces permanently disabled the M/T Downy off the coast of Iran’s Kharg Island and the M/T Stark 1 near Jask. American forces also destroyed the unladen M/T Kylo, also known as the Noxen, in the Gulf of Oman after the crew was directed to abandon the vessel, according to CENTCOM. The U.S. military said the three tankers were part of what it described as a multibillion-dollar “shadow network” allegedly used to finance the IRGC and its regional proxies.

“Let the message to the IRGC be clear,” CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said. “If you shoot at two of our ships, we will impose an even higher economic cost.” Cooper added that the United States would continue defending its forces and, if necessary, could target Iran’s oil fleet.

Iran condemns the strikes

Iran has condemned the U.S. attacks and warned that continued attacks on Iranian vessels could lead to further military retaliation. The strikes represent a significant escalation in the confrontation between Washington and Tehran, particularly because they directly target Iranian oil shipping. One of the attacks occurred near Kharg Island, Iran’s major oil-export hub.

The latest exchange of fire also raises concerns about the security of commercial shipping and energy supplies in and around the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important oil-shipping routes.