Rubio, Jaishankar Reaffirm U.S.-India Ties, Set $500 Billion Trade Goal

MUMBAI, India — U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar reaffirmed their countries’ commitment to strengthening bilateral relations during a reception marking the 250th anniversary of American independence in Mumbai. The event, titled the Freedom 250 Reception, also featured remarks by U.S. Ambassador to India Sergio Gor. The speakers emphasized economic cooperation, technological innovation, maritime security and the strategic importance of U.S.-India relations.

Ambassador Gor said bilateral trade had exceeded $240 billion and outlined an ambitious goal of increasing it to more than $500 billion within the next three years. He highlighted opportunities for cooperation in semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, defense and advanced artificial intelligence. Gor also noted the significant presence of American companies in Mumbai and the role of U.S. institutional investors in Indian equity markets.

Rubio described the U.S.-India relationship as increasingly important to the future of the 21st century. He stressed the need for both countries to harness advances in artificial intelligence and quantum computing for public benefit while mitigating potential harms. Rubio also emphasized the importance of open maritime routes and a free and secure Indo-Pacific, arguing that international shipping lanes should not be dominated or controlled by any single nation. Acknowledging that the two countries would not agree on every issue, Rubio said their alignment on core national interests presented an opportunity to shape the future together.

Jaishankar highlighted Mumbai’s historical and contemporary role in India’s commercial, financial and technological links with the United States. He pointed to cooperation in infrastructure, education, agriculture and technology, as well as newer initiatives and frameworks, including the Quad, Mission 500, Pax Silica and the FORGE Initiative. Jaishankar also welcomed the U.S. administration’s decision to extradite Tahawwur Hussain Rana, whom he described as one of the key culprits in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. He called for zero tolerance toward terrorism and emphasized the right to defend against it.

Concluding his remarks, Jaishankar said expanding areas of common interest in trade, investment, technology and energy would be essential to deepening bilateral relations. Both sides expressed their commitment to advancing the strategic partnership as the United States prepares to mark 250 years of independence in 2026.




Landau Calls for Shift From Aid to Investment in U.S. Economic Diplomacy

Shibbir Ahmed, New York — U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau has called for a stronger focus on trade and private investment as a long-term alternative to traditional foreign aid, saying economic diplomacy should play a central role in strengthening relationships between countries. Speaking at a Trade Over Aid Deals Showcase on September 25, Landau said economic and commercial issues had for decades taken a back seat in diplomacy, which he argued had too often focused primarily on political, military and security matters.

‘Economic and commercial issues should be treated as a core element of diplomacy’, Landau said, arguing that governments have a responsibility to create prosperity, economic opportunities and jobs for their people. Landau said economic projects can create lasting relationships that survive changes in government. While acknowledging that aid programs can help countries remain afloat, he argued that long-term economic projects can provide more sustainable value by generating investment, infrastructure, employment and economic growth.

He also emphasized that foreign investment does not necessarily mean a loss of national sovereignty. According to Landau, governments should establish clear terms and conditions for investments so that both investors and host countries understand their respective obligations and potential returns.

‘Investment is an engine of growth’, Landau said, urging governments and businesses to view foreign capital as an opportunity to expand economic activity rather than as a threat to sovereignty. He described investment relationships as potentially “win-win” arrangements, saying capital inflows can support infrastructure, jobs and economic growth while also strengthening political and commercial ties between countries.

U.S. private sector at the center

Landau said one of his priorities as deputy secretary is to improve communication between the U.S. government and American companies seeking investment opportunities overseas. He noted that during trips around the world, he frequently hears foreign governments asking why American companies are absent from projects where businesses from other countries have submitted bids.

Landau said he had previously focused largely on American companies directly operating overseas, including construction, infrastructure, oil and mining firms. He said he now sees a greater role for U.S. financial capital, particularly from New York City, which he described as the world’s financial capital.

‘There are trillions of dollars here that can be deployed around the world,’ Landau said, arguing that attracting capital providers could help connect foreign investment opportunities with American operating companies. He said he recently met with major capital providers to discuss why they were not investing in certain countries and what obstacles were preventing greater U.S. participation.

Calls for a more coordinated U.S. approach

Landau also acknowledged concerns from private investors about the fragmented nature of the U.S. government’s economic engagement overseas. He said investors sometimes want the U.S. government to have a financial stake or other involvement in projects to reduce risks associated with political changes in foreign countries.

Government officials, private-sector representatives and international participants attend the “Trade Over Aid Deals Showcase” as U.S. officials discuss expanding trade and investment opportunities.

Landau said he wants the State Department, Commerce Department, Export-Import Bank, Development Finance Corporation and Millennium Challenge Corporation to work more closely together and make the U.S. government a more accessible “one-stop shop” for businesses seeking to invest overseas.

He cited the Pacific Islands as one region where he believes greater investment opportunities exist. Landau said he had organized a business summit and investment roundtable in Honolulu in February with Pacific Island leaders and U.S. private-sector representatives to identify sectors where investment could be expanded.

Landau said the U.S. government’s role is to improve communication between governments, businesses and investors and help identify opportunities for private capital. Concluding his remarks, Landau reaffirmed his commitment to expanding the global role of American businesses and called for what he described as an “unprecedented golden era for the American private sector around the world.”




Why Bangladesh must reconsider its trade agreement with the US

M.G. Quibria: Some trade deals are negotiated. Others are simply accepted. Bangladesh’s Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) with the United States, signed in the last frantic days of an interim government, looks unmistakably like the second kind. And seven months later, Dhaka is still making commitments under a bargain whose legal foundations have crumbled twice.

An old grievance, formalised

The programme that produced it began on April 2, 2025, when President Trump unveiled what his administration called “Liberation Day”: country-by-country tariffs calculated using a formula publicly associated with trade adviser Peter Navarro and built around each nation’s trade surplus with the United States. According to Regime Change, the 2026 book by New York Times reporters Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, when the President found the competing economic estimates from Navarro, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick unsatisfying, he turned to aide Natalie Harp to produce numbers closer to what he already intuitively believed, undercutting any claim to scientific rigour in how the tariff rates presented on Liberation Day were determined. Indeed, the President’s instinct behind the policy was long-standing. In a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Boston Globe on September 2, 1987, Trump argued that America’s allies were free-riding on US trade and defence policy and ought to pay for it. Thirty-nine years later, the same argument animates the reciprocal tariff programme.

Out of that programme came the ART, the bilateral instrument Washington has used to reset tariff terms one country at a time. Partners could be classified into five rough groups: first, nations with a fully signed ART; second, nations with only a framework, still under negotiation; third, nations offered bespoke “strategic trade and investment” arrangements, such as Korea and Japan, instead of a standard treaty; fourth, Gulf states substituting investment pledges for any treaty; and fifth, nations where talks have broken down into open disputes. As of this writing, of the ten countries that have actually signed the ART, Bangladesh’s agreement has the strongest claim to being the most one-sided. Not because any single clause is exotic; most of its mechanisms exist, in some form, in some other countries’ agreements too. It is the aggregate, how the obligations stack up and the peculiar circumstances under which Dhaka signed at all, that sets it apart.

The ground shifts twice

The legal scaffolding beneath the tariff side of the ART programme has meanwhile been dismantled and rebuilt twice. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) never authorised a president to impose tariffs at all, striking down the Liberation Day regime in its entirety, including the country-specific caps individual ARTs had negotiated. Within days, the administration invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to address a serious balance-of-payments crisis and imposed a flat 10% global surcharge, a stopgap capped by statute at 150 days. That, too, expired on schedule on July 24, 2026, and was replaced, without a day’s gap in collections, by new Section 301 tariffs targeting inadequate enforcement of forced-labour import bans, set at 10% or 12.5% across sixty economies. A second Section 301 investigation, aimed at resetting rates based on “excess manufacturing capacity” across sixteen economies, including China and Vietnam, remains unresolved months past its own informal deadline, with its statutory window stretching into March 2027. Bangladesh, notably, is featured in both investigations.

Through all of this, the underlying non-tariff commitments inside the ARTs, including investment pledges, forced-labour provisions and standards recognition, have proven sturdier than the tariffs themselves, surviving as separate memoranda even as the specific rate attached to each deal was rebuilt from scratch: first under IEEPA, then Section 122, then Section 301. Against this backdrop of a legal foundation that keeps giving way, Bangladesh’s bargain has to be understood.

A deal nobody can quite explain

The first puzzle is why, among South Asian nations, Bangladesh rushed to sign first. Looking back, it’s hard to identify what that haste bought. If the goal was to lock in better terms than a slower negotiation might yield, the text doesn’t bear that out. Its neighbours all declined to sign anything resembling a full ART and appear none the worse for their caution. Pakistan and Sri Lanka remain in active, unhurried negotiations, without conceding Bangladesh’s terms. India operates under its own separate interim framework, despite being in the crosshairs of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, which targets purchasers of discounted Russian oil and gas. More tellingly, Vietnam and the Philippines, both of which export far more to the United States and run considerably larger trade surpluses than Bangladesh, have signed no comparable agreement at all. If exposure to American tariff pressure were the deciding factor, those are the economies that should have moved first. Instead, it was Bangladesh, with lower exports and a smaller trade surplus, that signed the most sweeping and asymmetric text of the ten.

Signed by a government on its way out

Compounding the puzzle is the timing. Bangladesh signed its ART on February 9, 2026, under the outgoing interim administration of Dr Muhammad Yunus, three days before a national election that would replace it. No elected parliament debated or approved it before it was signed, and the new one has not scrutinised it since taking office. No one has clearly explained what economic or political calculus persuaded an interim government to lock in an open-ended trade relationship on its way out the door. Critics are right to call this what it is: a lame-duck administration locking its successors into commitments the country never had a chance to vote on. That charge doesn’t apply to the other signatories, whose governments actually had a mandate to sign.

A textual imbalance without precedent

The imbalance is visible even in the drafting. One textual count in the Bangladeshi press noted that the ART uses 179 instances of the mandatory “shall”, most of which are attached to Bangladeshi commitments. Such counts are an imperfect measure of substantive burden, but the broader text leaves little doubt about the direction of the obligations: Bangladesh promises considerably more than Washington does. No comparable analysis has been published for the other ARTs, so this is suggestive rather than a verified ranking.

The harshest penalty on the highest starting tariff

An analysis by the non-partisan think tank Peterson Institute for International Economics concludes that these ART deals were “built to push America’s trade partners away from China”. Bangladesh’s agreement carries a non-market-economy clause, foreclosing new trade deals with countries the US designates as non-market economies, including China, Russia, Vietnam, Belarus and others, on pain of snapback tariffs. For Bangladesh, the non-market clause sits in the same maximum-severity tier as five other agreements, including Cambodia’s and Guatemala’s. What is unusual is what is riding on it: Bangladesh’s original “Liberation Day” tariff was 37%, among the highest of any ART signatory, so a snapback would cost Dhaka more than almost any peer. It is, in effect, the same gun pointed at everyone, but loaded heaviest for Dhaka.

Reaching beyond tariffs

The agreement’s obligations extend well beyond market access, reaching into Bangladesh’s regulatory discretion, digital governance, procurement behaviour and its future room to manoeuvre with third countries. Its specific commitments include not contesting US export-tax rebates at the WTO and not applying VAT measures that discriminate against US goods. None of these mechanisms, taken individually, is exotic; versions appear in some other cases. What makes Bangladesh’s case distinctive is the accumulation: a documented obligation imbalance without precedent, one of the highest snapback tariffs in the group and a signing process with no democratic mandate. Whether that combination makes it objectively “the worst” of the ten ARTs is a matter of interpretation.

An exchange that keeps getting more unequal

Post-signing developments have widened the imbalance, not narrowed it. Dhaka has kept expanding its Boeing commitments in a confusing sequence. Bangladesh raised its planned Boeing purchase from 14 to 25 aircraft in July 2025. Yet, on April 30, 2026, Biman Bangladesh Airlines formally ordered 14 jets, its largest-ever order, valued at about $3.7 billion. Then, on August 30, US envoy Sergio Gor announced that Bangladesh had committed “billions of dollars” to buy still more Boeing aircraft, “significantly increasing” its initial order, without identifying the number, models, price or contractual status of the additional planes. The next day, President Trump disclosed that Prime Minister Tarique Rahman had written to him concerning a Boeing purchase. Trump thanked Rahman for his “decision of purchase”, adding, “Boeing will not let you down, and I will not forget.” Yet Bangladeshi officials subsequently said that no separate agreement beyond Biman’s 14-aircraft order had been signed. What additional purchase Trump was thanking Rahman for, and whether it represents a firm contract, a political commitment or merely an intention to buy more aircraft, therefore remains publicly unclear.

The contrast with Indonesia is instructive. Garuda Indonesia, negotiating a comparable Boeing commitment under its own ART, had still not signed a binding contract as of late 2026, while Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund warned that deliveries could take up to seven years, given Boeing’s production backlog and unresolved financing questions. The Strategic Trade and Investment deals with Japan and Korea have been so large that the Wall Street Journal argues they will never materialise. The same uncertainty has been flagged with respect to the Gulf countries.

Bangladesh, by comparison, has moved faster and further, committing to more while securing less in return, even as its underlying agreement is, by most measures, the most lopsided of the treaties.

What makes the speed more striking still is what the process appears to have skipped over. Biman is, by its own numbers, in no position for a $3.7 billion wager: it loses money on most of its international routes, carries more than Tk 6,000 crore in unpaid dues to the Civil Aviation Authority and has turned a profit in only a few years of its existence. It is, in other words, a loss-making carrier committing to its largest-ever purchase on a timetable set by the seller and the geopolitics of a trade dispute, not by any internal business logic. A capital commitment of this magnitude would ordinarily trigger commensurate due diligence, including board-level risk assessment, fleet-financing review and route-profitability modelling. There is no evidence that any of this happened.

The pattern repeats in energy. On August 12, 2026, Bangladesh’s cabinet cleared a twelve-year liquefied natural gas deal with Gunvor USA covering 117 cargoes, roughly 7.5 million tonnes, through 2038. The contract was awarded without competitive bidding, through an unusual state-to-state pricing formula negotiated with a private trading firm, and the government has defended it as prudent hedging against Qatar’s own difficulties in meeting its LNG commitments amid regional tensions.

Meanwhile, the reciprocal side of the bargain remains thin to the point of translucence. Bangladesh’s garment sector, which accounts for more than 85% of everything the country exports to the United States, now faces a real cumulative burden considerably higher than the headline figures suggest: the 10% Section 301 forced-labour duty stacks on top of an existing 15.6% MFN tariff on apparel, pushing the effective rate into the mid-20% range. In exchange, the US commitment on garments, under Article 5.3 of the agreement, remains only a promise to “establish a mechanism” for zero-tariff access tied to US-origin cotton and fibre, with no volume guarantees or deadline. Bangladesh is executing binding, multi-billion-dollar purchase commitments in real time against a promise that, more than half a year after signing, remains entirely undrawn and vague.

A legal irony, and a democratic one

There is further legal ambiguity. The agreement contemplated domestic procedures before entry into force, and Washington’s February announcement explicitly said those procedures remained to be completed. The striking point, therefore, is not that the ART “does not exist”. It is that Dhaka has acted with more certainty than the underlying tariff regime warrants. Aircraft orders, LNG contracts and purchase pledges are all proceeding on schedule against a treaty that, strictly speaking, does not yet exist. The irony compounds: the agreement’s own snapback clause authorises Washington to reimpose tariffs under Executive Order 14257 if Bangladesh defaults, but the Supreme Court has already struck that order down, and neither government has said what replaces it. Dhaka, in effect, is honouring the letter of a contract with no legal force, enforced by a threat that no longer exists.

A second irony is more political than legal. Bangladesh, as of this year, has once again emerged as a democracy. One might expect a vigorous parliamentary reckoning with a sweeping, open-ended trade deal signed by an outgoing, unelected administration. Dhaka also inherited a clear opening to ask whether the bargain still made sense once the legal foundation of Washington’s original tariff threat collapsed. Instead, the commitments have continued and may be expanding. The mystery is no longer why Bangladesh signed such a deal. It is why, having gained both the democratic authority and the legal opening to reconsider it, Dhaka appears so reluctant to use either.

Dr M.G. Quibria is an economist and public policy commentator whose work explores trade, development, governance and democratic change in Bangladesh and beyond. He can be reached at mgquibria.morgan@gmail.com.




Trump to Personally Welcome Xi in Washington

Shibbir Ahmed, Washington DC — U.S. President Donald Trump is set to personally welcome Chinese President Xi Jinping at Joint Base Andrews when Xi arrives in the Washington area next week for a high-profile state visit, in a rare protocol gesture by a U.S. president.

Xi is expected to arrive on Wednesday, September 23, ahead of talks with Trump at the White House on September 24. Trump’s decision to greet Xi at the airport marks a departure from the usual practice of receiving visiting foreign leaders at the White House.

The visit will include a formal arrival ceremony at the White House, a military review in the Rose Garden and a state dinner hosted by Trump and First Lady Melania Trump. Senior U.S. officials said a number of leading technology executives are expected to attend the dinner.

Trade, rare-earth supplies and artificial intelligence are expected to be among the major issues discussed by the two leaders. The summit comes as Washington and Beijing continue efforts to manage tensions over trade and technology while seeking greater stability in their bilateral relationship.

The upcoming meeting will be the second face-to-face encounter between Trump and Xi this year, following Trump’s visit to Beijing in May. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng is also scheduled to hold preparatory economic and trade talks with U.S. officials ahead of the summit.




President Urges US to Simplify Visa Processing for Bangladeshis

DHAKA – President Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir today urged the United States to simplify its visa processing procedures for Bangladeshi tourists and business people to facilitate people-to-people and business ties between the two countries. The President made the call when US ambassador to Bangladesh Brent T Christenen paid a courtesy call on him at Bangabhaban this morning.

During the meeting, the US envoy congratulated the President on his assumption of office as the President of Bangladesh. Recalling the past US investment and cooperation in the country’s agricultural development, the President called for further US investment and cooperation in the country’s development sector.

He also referred to Chevron’s investment and important role in the development of the country’s energy sector and urged increased US investment in Bangladesh’s energy, information technology, infrastructure, and health and high-tech industries sectors. The President also sought US cooperation in ensuring the safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation of the Rohingyas to their homeland.

Thanking the US ambassador, the President said, “The United States is one of the Bangladesh’s important development partners. The existing trade relations with the US are playing an important role in Bangladesh’s economic development.”

On international relations, the President said, “Bangladesh attaches the highest importance to the principles of independence, sovereignty, national interest, mutual respect and equality in its international relations.”

He expressed the hope that bilateral relations and trade agreements with the United States would be further expanded in the days to come through mutual respect while protecting common interests. Referring to the recent bilateral trade agreements with US, the President said, “This is an important development in expanding the trade relations between the two countries.”

“There is a scope to make the agreement more balanced and mutually beneficial, taking into consideration the economic realities and interests of both the countries,” he added.

The ambassador assured that the US would continue its cooperation with Bangladesh and stressed the importance of strengthening cooperation with ASEAN countries. He also reiterated his US’s interest in further deepening and diversifying relations with Bangladesh. Military secretary to the President and Press Secretary and senior officials were present during the meeting.