Elaine Pearson – The mass arrest of attendees at a meeting of a small left-wing political party in Dhaka on September 26 marks the latest reported incident raising concerns about civil and political rights in Bangladesh.

Police took approximately 290 supporters of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) into custody after members of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) youth wing, Jubo Dal, alleged that the gathering was a “secret” meeting of the banned Awami League, led by former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. A court subsequently remanded 27 of those arrested to custody over allegations that they had chanted “Joy Bangla,” or “Victory to Bengal,” a slogan associated with the Awami League.

The JSD was part of a 14-party alliance led by the Awami League, which governed Bangladesh from 2009 until 2024. That government was toppled following student-led protests in which hundreds of people were killed by security forces.

The BNP, now in power, faced severe repression during the Awami League’s tenure. However, since taking office following the February elections, the BNP government has also targeted people perceived as political opponents. Hundreds of Awami League members are reportedly in jail, many without formal charges.

Police have repeatedly raided gatherings allegedly involving Awami League supporters. On September 26, the same day as the JSD meeting in Dhaka, police in Barisal detained 12 Awami League activists accused of holding a “secret” meeting to “plan sabotage.” Two days later, another 15 people were arrested in Dhaka under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009 on similar allegations. Those detained in both cases said they had gathered to commemorate Hasina’s birthday.

During Hasina’s rule, Bangladesh experienced widespread and serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and the arbitrary detention of political opponents.

The BNP came to power promising to restore human rights and uphold the rule of law. Yet its reported use of arbitrary detention against perceived opponents, alongside the rollback of human rights safeguards proposed by the interim government, raises questions about its commitment to those promises.

International human rights law protects freedom of expression and freedom of association. These rights apply to everyone, regardless of political affiliation. Past abuses committed under the Awami League government cannot justify similar violations by the BNP government today.

Bangladesh’s political history offers repeated warnings about the consequences of suppressing dissent. Protecting civil liberties, ensuring due process, and allowing peaceful political participation are essential to preventing another cycle of repression. Political accountability must apply to every government, regardless of which party holds power.

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Elaine Pearson, HRW, London

Sitangshu Guha – The so-called “cockroaches” first took to the streets demanding education reform. Their demand had some merit, and the government eventually conceded. The education minister resigned, but that concession only emboldened the protesters.

This time, however, they have joined a movement demanding the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner. That is a misguided step. Meanwhile, the movement’s leading figure has reportedly faced public humiliation at the hands of a crowd in Bombay. If the movement continues along this path, other leaders could soon find themselves facing similar public hostility, including the possibility of being pelted with rotten eggs.

The public, the argument goes, is beginning to recognize that the movement’s ultimate objective is not education reform but the destabilization of the government. Had its leaders instead congratulated Smit Machchhar and called for a nationwide day of celebration, they might have earned the goodwill and support of millions across India.

The movement appears to seek a political upheaval similar to what occurred in Bangladesh. Yet, in my assessment, Bangladesh’s recent political upheaval was not a genuine revolution but a seizure of power by Islamist forces, followed by national decline and widespread hardship over the subsequent two years.

India’s younger generation, however, is sufficiently educated and politically discerning to reject such an outcome. India has weathered comparable movements before, and its federal structure remains a significant safeguard against the concentration of power.

Power in India is distributed among multiple institutions and levels of government. Its political system does not lend itself easily to unchecked autocracy. Elections remain the principal constitutional mechanism for transferring power. India’s electoral system enjoys international recognition, while its judiciary and media serve as important pillars of democratic accountability.

Although these institutions are not beyond criticism, they provide essential checks and balances. No government should be able to exercise unrestrained power by circumventing them.

The protesters, in my view, have failed to maintain the transparency and impartiality they claim to represent. Their movement raises questions about whether they are being used by other political forces to advance a broader agenda. Those forces, according to this argument, include the Left, Islamist groups, anti-Hindu political elements, and sidelined leaders who have lost power and are eager to regain it.

Anti-Hindu politics, I contend, has lost much of its former appeal in India, and political forces associated with it may face further setbacks in future elections. The Left and Islamist groups may appear ideologically opposed, but they can sometimes find common ground in their opposition to the ruling establishment.

India’s enemies, the argument goes, are not necessarily all outside its borders. Some domestic political actors may also undermine national interests while taking advantage of the freedoms afforded by democracy.

One contradiction is particularly striking: while many around the world are celebrating Smit Machchhar, some participants in the movement appear reluctant to congratulate him. The reason, I suspect, is political calculation. They may fear that praising the pilot would also require them to acknowledge the role of his Muslim co-pilot, potentially complicating their efforts to retain the support of particular voting constituencies.

The Government of India, or the ruling party, could organize a nationwide, two-day celebration in honor of Smit Machchhar. Such an event would recognize his achievement and provide an opportunity for citizens across the country to express their pride. Smit Machchhar represents India—not the so-called cockroaches or the political forces that support them.

Let me make one point clear: I am not an Indian citizen; I live in the United States. Readers are free to agree or disagree with my views. Nevertheless, I believe that those who opposed Operation Sindoor, raised slogans such as “Kashmir Mange Azadi,” or used the derogatory expression “Hinduism is Gandha Dharma” should face serious scrutiny when their political positions are assessed. In my view, such rhetoric raises legitimate questions about their commitment to India’s national interests.

India is the world’s largest democracy, and I sincerely hope it continues to prosper. But defending democracy also requires safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process.

Illegal immigrants and infiltrators should not be permitted to vote simply by virtue of being present in the country. In this context, the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls and the National Register of Citizens (NRC) are, in my view, important instruments for addressing concerns about voter eligibility and national security. Their implementation, however, must be consistent with the law and the rights of eligible citizens.

India’s democratic strength lies in its institutions, its constitutional framework, and the participation of its people. Political movements should contribute to strengthening those foundations—not weakening them. Smit Machchhar represents India. India deserves a democracy that is strong, secure, and free.

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Sitangshu Guha, New York
E. guhasb@gmail.com

M.G. Quibria: Some trade deals are negotiated. Others are simply accepted. Bangladesh’s Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) with the United States, signed in the last frantic days of an interim government, looks unmistakably like the second kind. And seven months later, Dhaka is still making commitments under a bargain whose legal foundations have crumbled twice.

An old grievance, formalised

The programme that produced it began on April 2, 2025, when President Trump unveiled what his administration called “Liberation Day”: country-by-country tariffs calculated using a formula publicly associated with trade adviser Peter Navarro and built around each nation’s trade surplus with the United States. According to Regime Change, the 2026 book by New York Times reporters Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, when the President found the competing economic estimates from Navarro, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick unsatisfying, he turned to aide Natalie Harp to produce numbers closer to what he already intuitively believed, undercutting any claim to scientific rigour in how the tariff rates presented on Liberation Day were determined. Indeed, the President’s instinct behind the policy was long-standing. In a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Boston Globe on September 2, 1987, Trump argued that America’s allies were free-riding on US trade and defence policy and ought to pay for it. Thirty-nine years later, the same argument animates the reciprocal tariff programme.

Out of that programme came the ART, the bilateral instrument Washington has used to reset tariff terms one country at a time. Partners could be classified into five rough groups: first, nations with a fully signed ART; second, nations with only a framework, still under negotiation; third, nations offered bespoke “strategic trade and investment” arrangements, such as Korea and Japan, instead of a standard treaty; fourth, Gulf states substituting investment pledges for any treaty; and fifth, nations where talks have broken down into open disputes. As of this writing, of the ten countries that have actually signed the ART, Bangladesh’s agreement has the strongest claim to being the most one-sided. Not because any single clause is exotic; most of its mechanisms exist, in some form, in some other countries’ agreements too. It is the aggregate, how the obligations stack up and the peculiar circumstances under which Dhaka signed at all, that sets it apart.

The ground shifts twice

The legal scaffolding beneath the tariff side of the ART programme has meanwhile been dismantled and rebuilt twice. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) never authorised a president to impose tariffs at all, striking down the Liberation Day regime in its entirety, including the country-specific caps individual ARTs had negotiated. Within days, the administration invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to address a serious balance-of-payments crisis and imposed a flat 10% global surcharge, a stopgap capped by statute at 150 days. That, too, expired on schedule on July 24, 2026, and was replaced, without a day’s gap in collections, by new Section 301 tariffs targeting inadequate enforcement of forced-labour import bans, set at 10% or 12.5% across sixty economies. A second Section 301 investigation, aimed at resetting rates based on “excess manufacturing capacity” across sixteen economies, including China and Vietnam, remains unresolved months past its own informal deadline, with its statutory window stretching into March 2027. Bangladesh, notably, is featured in both investigations.

Through all of this, the underlying non-tariff commitments inside the ARTs, including investment pledges, forced-labour provisions and standards recognition, have proven sturdier than the tariffs themselves, surviving as separate memoranda even as the specific rate attached to each deal was rebuilt from scratch: first under IEEPA, then Section 122, then Section 301. Against this backdrop of a legal foundation that keeps giving way, Bangladesh’s bargain has to be understood.

A deal nobody can quite explain

The first puzzle is why, among South Asian nations, Bangladesh rushed to sign first. Looking back, it’s hard to identify what that haste bought. If the goal was to lock in better terms than a slower negotiation might yield, the text doesn’t bear that out. Its neighbours all declined to sign anything resembling a full ART and appear none the worse for their caution. Pakistan and Sri Lanka remain in active, unhurried negotiations, without conceding Bangladesh’s terms. India operates under its own separate interim framework, despite being in the crosshairs of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, which targets purchasers of discounted Russian oil and gas. More tellingly, Vietnam and the Philippines, both of which export far more to the United States and run considerably larger trade surpluses than Bangladesh, have signed no comparable agreement at all. If exposure to American tariff pressure were the deciding factor, those are the economies that should have moved first. Instead, it was Bangladesh, with lower exports and a smaller trade surplus, that signed the most sweeping and asymmetric text of the ten.

Signed by a government on its way out

Compounding the puzzle is the timing. Bangladesh signed its ART on February 9, 2026, under the outgoing interim administration of Dr Muhammad Yunus, three days before a national election that would replace it. No elected parliament debated or approved it before it was signed, and the new one has not scrutinised it since taking office. No one has clearly explained what economic or political calculus persuaded an interim government to lock in an open-ended trade relationship on its way out the door. Critics are right to call this what it is: a lame-duck administration locking its successors into commitments the country never had a chance to vote on. That charge doesn’t apply to the other signatories, whose governments actually had a mandate to sign.

A textual imbalance without precedent

The imbalance is visible even in the drafting. One textual count in the Bangladeshi press noted that the ART uses 179 instances of the mandatory “shall”, most of which are attached to Bangladeshi commitments. Such counts are an imperfect measure of substantive burden, but the broader text leaves little doubt about the direction of the obligations: Bangladesh promises considerably more than Washington does. No comparable analysis has been published for the other ARTs, so this is suggestive rather than a verified ranking.

The harshest penalty on the highest starting tariff

An analysis by the non-partisan think tank Peterson Institute for International Economics concludes that these ART deals were “built to push America’s trade partners away from China”. Bangladesh’s agreement carries a non-market-economy clause, foreclosing new trade deals with countries the US designates as non-market economies, including China, Russia, Vietnam, Belarus and others, on pain of snapback tariffs. For Bangladesh, the non-market clause sits in the same maximum-severity tier as five other agreements, including Cambodia’s and Guatemala’s. What is unusual is what is riding on it: Bangladesh’s original “Liberation Day” tariff was 37%, among the highest of any ART signatory, so a snapback would cost Dhaka more than almost any peer. It is, in effect, the same gun pointed at everyone, but loaded heaviest for Dhaka.

Reaching beyond tariffs

The agreement’s obligations extend well beyond market access, reaching into Bangladesh’s regulatory discretion, digital governance, procurement behaviour and its future room to manoeuvre with third countries. Its specific commitments include not contesting US export-tax rebates at the WTO and not applying VAT measures that discriminate against US goods. None of these mechanisms, taken individually, is exotic; versions appear in some other cases. What makes Bangladesh’s case distinctive is the accumulation: a documented obligation imbalance without precedent, one of the highest snapback tariffs in the group and a signing process with no democratic mandate. Whether that combination makes it objectively “the worst” of the ten ARTs is a matter of interpretation.

An exchange that keeps getting more unequal

Post-signing developments have widened the imbalance, not narrowed it. Dhaka has kept expanding its Boeing commitments in a confusing sequence. Bangladesh raised its planned Boeing purchase from 14 to 25 aircraft in July 2025. Yet, on April 30, 2026, Biman Bangladesh Airlines formally ordered 14 jets, its largest-ever order, valued at about $3.7 billion. Then, on August 30, US envoy Sergio Gor announced that Bangladesh had committed “billions of dollars” to buy still more Boeing aircraft, “significantly increasing” its initial order, without identifying the number, models, price or contractual status of the additional planes. The next day, President Trump disclosed that Prime Minister Tarique Rahman had written to him concerning a Boeing purchase. Trump thanked Rahman for his “decision of purchase”, adding, “Boeing will not let you down, and I will not forget.” Yet Bangladeshi officials subsequently said that no separate agreement beyond Biman’s 14-aircraft order had been signed. What additional purchase Trump was thanking Rahman for, and whether it represents a firm contract, a political commitment or merely an intention to buy more aircraft, therefore remains publicly unclear.

The contrast with Indonesia is instructive. Garuda Indonesia, negotiating a comparable Boeing commitment under its own ART, had still not signed a binding contract as of late 2026, while Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund warned that deliveries could take up to seven years, given Boeing’s production backlog and unresolved financing questions. The Strategic Trade and Investment deals with Japan and Korea have been so large that the Wall Street Journal argues they will never materialise. The same uncertainty has been flagged with respect to the Gulf countries.

Bangladesh, by comparison, has moved faster and further, committing to more while securing less in return, even as its underlying agreement is, by most measures, the most lopsided of the treaties.

What makes the speed more striking still is what the process appears to have skipped over. Biman is, by its own numbers, in no position for a $3.7 billion wager: it loses money on most of its international routes, carries more than Tk 6,000 crore in unpaid dues to the Civil Aviation Authority and has turned a profit in only a few years of its existence. It is, in other words, a loss-making carrier committing to its largest-ever purchase on a timetable set by the seller and the geopolitics of a trade dispute, not by any internal business logic. A capital commitment of this magnitude would ordinarily trigger commensurate due diligence, including board-level risk assessment, fleet-financing review and route-profitability modelling. There is no evidence that any of this happened.

The pattern repeats in energy. On August 12, 2026, Bangladesh’s cabinet cleared a twelve-year liquefied natural gas deal with Gunvor USA covering 117 cargoes, roughly 7.5 million tonnes, through 2038. The contract was awarded without competitive bidding, through an unusual state-to-state pricing formula negotiated with a private trading firm, and the government has defended it as prudent hedging against Qatar’s own difficulties in meeting its LNG commitments amid regional tensions.

Meanwhile, the reciprocal side of the bargain remains thin to the point of translucence. Bangladesh’s garment sector, which accounts for more than 85% of everything the country exports to the United States, now faces a real cumulative burden considerably higher than the headline figures suggest: the 10% Section 301 forced-labour duty stacks on top of an existing 15.6% MFN tariff on apparel, pushing the effective rate into the mid-20% range. In exchange, the US commitment on garments, under Article 5.3 of the agreement, remains only a promise to “establish a mechanism” for zero-tariff access tied to US-origin cotton and fibre, with no volume guarantees or deadline. Bangladesh is executing binding, multi-billion-dollar purchase commitments in real time against a promise that, more than half a year after signing, remains entirely undrawn and vague.

A legal irony, and a democratic one

There is further legal ambiguity. The agreement contemplated domestic procedures before entry into force, and Washington’s February announcement explicitly said those procedures remained to be completed. The striking point, therefore, is not that the ART “does not exist”. It is that Dhaka has acted with more certainty than the underlying tariff regime warrants. Aircraft orders, LNG contracts and purchase pledges are all proceeding on schedule against a treaty that, strictly speaking, does not yet exist. The irony compounds: the agreement’s own snapback clause authorises Washington to reimpose tariffs under Executive Order 14257 if Bangladesh defaults, but the Supreme Court has already struck that order down, and neither government has said what replaces it. Dhaka, in effect, is honouring the letter of a contract with no legal force, enforced by a threat that no longer exists.

A second irony is more political than legal. Bangladesh, as of this year, has once again emerged as a democracy. One might expect a vigorous parliamentary reckoning with a sweeping, open-ended trade deal signed by an outgoing, unelected administration. Dhaka also inherited a clear opening to ask whether the bargain still made sense once the legal foundation of Washington’s original tariff threat collapsed. Instead, the commitments have continued and may be expanding. The mystery is no longer why Bangladesh signed such a deal. It is why, having gained both the democratic authority and the legal opening to reconsider it, Dhaka appears so reluctant to use either.

Dr M.G. Quibria is an economist and public policy commentator whose work explores trade, development, governance and democratic change in Bangladesh and beyond. He can be reached at mgquibria.morgan@gmail.com.

Bangladesh is once again facing a serious public health test. On one side, measles is spreading at an alarming rate; on the other, dengue cases are rising rapidly. The two diseases are different in nature, transmission and prevention. Yet their consequences are converging at the same point—the lives of people, the economic burden on families and the capacity of the country’s healthcare system.

What is particularly concerning is that measles is a vaccine-preventable disease. Effective vaccines have been available for decades. Yet gaps in vaccination coverage, disruptions in routine immunisation programmes and inadequate public awareness have allowed a preventable disease to develop into a major health concern. When this happens, it is no longer simply a medical problem; it raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the public health system.

Dengue, meanwhile, is not a new challenge for Bangladesh. The country has faced recurring outbreaks, particularly during and after the monsoon season. With years of experience in dealing with dengue, Bangladesh should have stronger forecasting, prevention and preparedness mechanisms in place. Yet whenever hospitals come under pressure from a growing number of patients, the same question returns: are we learning enough from previous outbreaks?

The greatest victims of this double health burden are children. Measles can be particularly dangerous for young children, while dengue can also become severe rapidly, especially when warning signs are missed. When the two diseases surge simultaneously, hospitals face additional pressure for beds, doctors, nurses, diagnostic facilities, medicines and other essential resources.

This brings us to the most important question: Are our hospitals prepared?

Simply increasing the number of hospital beds will not answer that question. Hospitals are the final line of defence. The real strength of a public health system lies in its ability to prevent people from reaching the hospital in the first place.

For measles, that means strengthening routine immunisation, identifying children who have missed vaccines and ensuring that they receive appropriate vaccination without delay. Vaccination efforts must reach not only urban communities but also children living in remote areas, informal settlements and other underserved communities.

The fight against dengue must begin outside hospitals. Eliminating mosquito breeding sites, preventing stagnant water, improving sanitation and ensuring coordinated action by health authorities and local governments are essential. Treating patients after they become seriously ill cannot be the country’s only strategy.

Urban management is equally important. Construction sites, abandoned containers, rooftops, drains and other places where water accumulates can become breeding grounds for Aedes mosquitoes. Efforts to eliminate such sites must be continuous rather than limited to short-term campaigns or occasional drives. What is needed is regular monitoring and accountability at the local level.

Another critical issue is data. Health authorities need timely information on where measles and dengue cases are increasing, which communities are most affected and which age groups face the greatest risks. Early and accurate data can allow authorities to respond before an outbreak becomes unmanageable. In modern public health management, success is not simply measured by how well a country responds after an outbreak; it is measured by how effectively it anticipates and prevents one.

We must also remember that a child’s death is never merely a statistic. Behind every death is a family, a future and dreams that will never be fulfilled. When children die from diseases that can be prevented or effectively managed, society has every reason to ask difficult questions about the effectiveness of public policy and healthcare delivery.

Increasing investment in healthcare is essential. But funding alone is not enough. There must also be transparency over how resources are spent, whether those resources reach the communities that need them and whether health authorities are capable of managing crises effectively.

The public also has a role to play. Parents must ensure that children receive their recommended vaccinations. Fever, rash, breathing difficulties or other concerning symptoms should not be ignored. People must also take responsibility for eliminating stagnant water around their homes and communities. But public awareness cannot become an excuse for institutional shortcomings. The state must ensure that citizens have access to reliable information, affordable healthcare and essential preventive services.

The simultaneous spread of measles and dengue should be treated as a serious warning. The question is not simply how many people have been infected or how many hospital beds remain available. The larger question is whether Bangladesh is building a health system capable of identifying risks early and containing outbreaks before they overwhelm hospitals.

Keeping hospitals prepared is essential. But an even greater priority is building a public health system in which the strongest line of defence exists before a patient reaches the hospital. Measles reminds us that no gap in vaccination coverage is safe. Dengue reminds us that the battle for public health begins not inside hospitals, but in homes, neighbourhoods and the way our cities are managed.

The response now must be based not on panic but on coordinated action. Bangladesh needs immediate medical preparedness alongside long-term prevention strategies. If this double outbreak becomes an opportunity to strengthen the country’s public health system, then the painful lessons of today can help prevent even greater losses tomorrow. The question, therefore, is not simply whether our hospitals are ready. The real question is whether our entire health system is ready.

Shibbir Ahmed, NEW YORK: Mastercard and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, have launched a $500 million global risk facility aimed at expanding digital financial access in emerging markets.

Announced on September 9, the initiative is designed to help banks, fintech companies and other financial institutions in emerging markets participate more easily in international payment networks. The program will initially focus on emerging markets in Europe and Latin America.

The initiative seeks to reduce financial and risk-related barriers that can prevent local financial institutions from expanding digital payment services. By helping institutions manage international payment-related exposure, the facility is expected to support broader access to secure and modern financial services.

According to the World Bank Group, many banks and fintech companies in emerging markets face difficulties meeting the financial requirements needed to participate in global payment systems. These barriers can leave millions of consumers and small businesses dependent on cash and excluded from the digital economy. The initiative aims to help address that gap by expanding access to digital payments for consumers and businesses, including small enterprises and underserved communities.

According to IFC, the program could support a significant expansion of digital payment activity through participating financial institutions. The initiative is expected to potentially enable around $280 billion in additional digital payment volume, facilitate the issuance of approximately 360 million new cards and bring about 90 million new active users into digital payment systems.

Women are expected to account for a significant share of the new users, with approximately 39 million women potentially gaining access through the initiative. IFC Managing Director Makhtar Diop said expanding digital payments in emerging markets can help create economic opportunities and bring more people and businesses into the formal financial system.

Mastercard said the initiative is intended not only to increase access to financial services but also to strengthen security, trust and resilience across digital payment ecosystems. The program reflects growing efforts to expand financial inclusion in emerging markets, where digital payments are increasing but access to international payment infrastructure remains uneven. By reducing barriers for local financial institutions, Mastercard and IFC aim to help more consumers and businesses participate in the formal digital economy.

Shibbir Ahmed, WASHINGTON DC  — Artificial intelligence could give developing countries a rare opportunity to accelerate economic growth, improve public services and address long-standing development challenges, according to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2026: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence.

The report examines the potential impact of artificial intelligence on 5.6 billion people living in low- and middle-income countries and argues that developing economies do not need to build the world’s most advanced AI systems to benefit from the technology. Instead, the World Bank recommends that countries follow a three-part approach: adopt, adapt and advance.

The report says developing countries can begin by adopting existing AI tools in areas such as health care, agriculture, education and government services. They can then adapt those technologies to local languages, institutions, data and development needs.

AI-powered tools are already helping farmers improve weather-related decisions, supporting medical screening and assisting teachers in preparing educational materials, according to the World Bank.

The institution warns, however, that the benefits of AI will not be automatic. Reliable infrastructure, digital connectivity, education, skills, strong institutions and access to relevant data will be essential if developing economies are to translate AI adoption into higher productivity and broader prosperity.

The report also highlights the risk of a widening global AI divide. A small number of countries and companies currently dominate advanced AI models, semiconductor production and data-center infrastructure, potentially creating new forms of technological dependence.

For most developing economies, the World Bank says building frontier AI models from scratch is unlikely to be a realistic near-term strategy because of the enormous costs involved in computing infrastructure, data and specialized talent.

Instead, countries should focus on practical applications that expand access to expertise and improve productivity while building the infrastructure and skills needed for deeper participation in the AI economy.

The World Bank describes the rapid spread of AI as a historic opportunity for developing economies, noting that AI is spreading faster than earlier general-purpose technologies such as electricity and the internet.

The report argues that strategic adoption and adaptation could allow developing countries to capture significant economic and social gains without having to compete directly with the world’s largest technology companies in developing frontier AI systems.

Orpi Ahmed: For Bangladeshis living in the United States, immigration policy is no longer an issue limited to lawyers or immigration experts. It is an important reality for families, workers, business owners, students, new immigrants and Bangladeshis planning to come to the United States in the future. In recent times, the U.S. immigration system has shown a clear trend toward stricter enforcement, increased scrutiny and stronger emphasis on immigration law enforcement. As a result, Bangladeshi expatriates now need to be more aware, cautious and committed to complying with the law than ever before.

At the beginning of 2026, the U.S. Department of State temporarily suspended the issuance of immigrant visas to nationals of 75 countries, including Bangladesh. However, on August 21, 2026, a federal court in New York declared the policy unlawful. According to the current information from the Department of State, the suspension is no longer in effect following the court order. At the same time, the department has indicated that the financial self-sufficiency of immigrants and the likelihood of their reliance on U.S. public benefits are receiving greater scrutiny.

This means there is no reason to assume that everything has returned completely to normal. Rather, immigration applications may face greater scrutiny regarding documentation, financial capacity, applicant information and overall eligibility.

In this reality, the first responsibility of Bangladeshi expatriates is to have a clear understanding of their immigration status. They should know whether they are lawful permanent residents, whether they are in the United States on valid employment visas, when their visas or other immigration documents expire, whether an application is pending, and whether they have any matter before an immigration authority or court.

Many immigrants who have lived in the United States for years may begin to take their status for granted. But even a minor mistake under immigration law can sometimes lead to serious consequences. Therefore, it is important to regularly check the validity and status of visas, green cards, employment authorization, applications, court documents and other important records.

The second important issue is to avoid providing false or inaccurate information on any immigration application or government form. Intentionally withholding information, providing a false address, using fraudulent documents or submitting inconsistent information can create serious legal problems in the future.

In an era of social media and extensive online communication, inconsistencies between information provided by an applicant in different places can also raise questions. Therefore, before submitting any application, all information should be carefully reviewed and verified. Where necessary, applicants should seek advice from a qualified immigration attorney.

The third issue is the need to remain cautious about misleading advice. Many Bangladeshi expatriates obtain immigration-related information from friends, social media or unlicensed advisers. But U.S. immigration law is highly complex and changes frequently. A strategy that works in one person’s case does not necessarily apply to another person’s circumstances.

Therefore, before making an important immigration decision, it is advisable to consult a qualified immigration attorney or a recognized legal assistance organization. This is particularly important in cases involving detention, removal notices, court proceedings, asylum applications, green-card issues or citizenship matters.

There is also growing concern over detention and deportation. In a recent case, the United States used for the first time a special “Alien Terrorist Removal Court,” established many years ago but never previously used, to deport an Afghan lawful permanent resident. The case was not a specific action against Bangladeshis, but it demonstrates how seriously U.S. authorities are approaching immigration enforcement.

At the same time, U.S. courts are also defining the limits of various immigration policies adopted by the administration. Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a policy requiring certain immigrants to be detained without bond hearings was unlawful. With federal courts taking differing positions on immigration detention policies, some issues could eventually reach the Supreme Court.

This means that while immigration enforcement is becoming stricter, awareness of legal rights is equally important. If a Bangladeshi expatriate comes into contact with immigration authorities, they should not make decisions out of fear or panic. They should have a basic understanding of their legal status, rights and the procedures that may apply to their situation.

Families also need to be prepared. Particularly in families where the immigration status of a parent or guardian is uncertain, important documents, children’s school and health information, and emergency contact details should be kept in a secure and accessible place. Family members should also know whom to contact in an emergency.

Employment-related matters require caution as well. Individuals holding employment-based visas should comply with the terms of their visas, employment authorization requirements and applicable rules governing their employment. Before changing jobs, changing locations or making any major employment-related decision, they should make sure they understand the relevant immigration requirements.

Similarly, those who wish to apply for U.S. citizenship after obtaining permanent residence should prepare carefully for the naturalization process. Citizenship is not merely a status or privilege; it also involves long-term legal and civic responsibilities. Applicants should therefore make sure their immigration history, tax-related matters and required documents are in order before applying.

Another major responsibility for the Bangladeshi community is to promote awareness about reliable information. Immigration-related rumors can spread rapidly. People should not assume that everything they see on social media is true. Official information from the U.S. Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and the courts should be given priority.

During periods of immigration-policy changes, exaggerated claims such as “all Bangladeshis will be deported,” “all visas have been suspended” or “everyone will be arrested under the new rules” can spread quickly. Such rumors do more than create fear; they can sometimes lead people to make harmful legal decisions.

Bangladeshi organizations, community leaders, mosques, social institutions and the media can also play an important role in this regard. Regular awareness programs on immigration law, dissemination of reliable information and guidance on where to obtain legitimate legal assistance can help protect the community from misinformation.

Most importantly, Bangladeshis living in the United States need to remember that complying with the law and knowing one’s rights are equally important. It is not enough to be aware of tougher enforcement. People must also understand their legal protections and what steps they should take when facing an immigration-related issue.

Under the current circumstances, several matters are particularly important for Bangladeshi expatriates: regularly reviewing their immigration status; keeping track of the expiration dates of important documents; providing accurate information on government forms; fulfilling tax and other legal obligations; never ignoring an official notice or court document; and seeking assistance from a qualified immigration attorney when necessary.

Another point deserves particular emphasis: awareness, not fear, is the strongest form of protection. It is wrong to make rushed decisions out of panic simply because immigration enforcement is becoming stricter. At the same time, it would be equally unwise to underestimate the changing situation.

The Bangladeshi community in the United States is now an important and established community. Its economic contributions, businesses, professional achievements and social engagement continue to grow. Therefore, creating greater awareness of immigration policies and legal rights among Bangladeshis is not merely an individual responsibility; it is a matter of concern for the entire community.

Ultimately, U.S. immigration policy is constantly evolving, and every policy decision does not apply to everyone in the same way. One person’s experience cannot determine another person’s future. Therefore, rather than rumors, rely on official information; rather than assumptions, seek legal advice; and rather than fear, prepare.

At a time of increasingly strict immigration enforcement, the safest approach is to understand the law, comply with it and seek appropriate legal assistance when necessary. For every Bangladeshi living in the United States, the most important responsibility now is to remain informed about their own and their family’s immigration status and to take prompt and appropriate action whenever circumstances change.

— Journalist, Elmhurst, New York

Editorial:

Bangladesh’s Rohingya crisis is no longer simply a humanitarian emergency. After years of hosting a large displaced population, the crisis has increasingly become intertwined with national security, border management, economic pressure, environmental degradation and regional stability.

Bangladesh has demonstrated remarkable humanitarian responsibility by providing shelter and assistance to Rohingya refugees fleeing violence in Myanmar. But humanitarian assistance, however essential, cannot be a permanent solution. The longer the crisis continues, the greater the burden becomes for Bangladesh—and the greater the risks become for the refugees themselves.

The fundamental question is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to avoid: How long can Bangladesh continue to manage the crisis without a credible pathway to resolving it?

Food, healthcare, education and shelter remain essential for the Rohingya population. International humanitarian assistance must continue. But relief programmes address the consequences of displacement, not its root causes.

The central issue remains unchanged: why are the Rohingya unable to return safely to their homeland, and what must be done to create the conditions for a voluntary, safe and dignified return?That is where diplomacy must take centre stage.

A humanitarian crisis with security implications 

The prolonged presence of large refugee communities has placed significant pressure on Bangladesh, particularly in Cox’s Bazar and surrounding areas. Local infrastructure, public services, the environment and economic opportunities have all faced additional pressure.

There is also a growing security dimension. Concerns over organised crime, human trafficking, narcotics networks, illegal arms flows and the activities of armed groups in and around refugee camps cannot be ignored. At the same time, it is important not to stigmatise the Rohingya population as a whole. The overwhelming majority are victims of displacement who want security, basic rights and the opportunity to return home.

The challenge for Bangladesh is to protect the refugee population while preventing criminal and armed networks from exploiting the vulnerability created by prolonged displacement. This requires stronger law enforcement, intelligence cooperation, border surveillance and action against trafficking and organised crime. But security measures must also remain consistent with humanitarian principles. Ordinary refugees should not become victims of collective suspicion or punishment.

Myanmar remains at the centre of the problem

Ultimately, the Rohingya crisis cannot be permanently resolved inside Bangladesh because the root of the displacement lies in Myanmar. The continuing instability in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State, makes the prospect of safe and sustainable repatriation increasingly complicated. If conditions inside Rakhine do not allow refugees to return with adequate security and basic rights, simply sending people back would not constitute a genuine solution.

Unsafe repatriation is not a solution; it risks creating another cycle of displacement. For that reason, Bangladesh must continue to insist that any repatriation process be voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable. The international community also has a responsibility that goes beyond humanitarian fundraising.

From aid diplomacy to solution-oriented diplomacy

For years, international attention has focused heavily on humanitarian assistance. That support has been indispensable. But the international response cannot remain confined to raising funds to sustain refugee camps indefinitely. The objective must now be to build a credible international framework for a lasting political solution.

Bangladesh should intensify diplomatic engagement with the United Nations, regional organisations and countries capable of exercising political and economic influence over Myanmar. The major powers and regional actors must be encouraged to play a more active role in creating conditions for safe and sustainable repatriation.

Diplomatic discussions should move beyond general expressions of concern. There must be greater focus on practical questions: security guarantees, citizenship and legal rights, freedom of movement, access to essential services, property and livelihood rights, and international monitoring of the repatriation process. Without addressing these issues, repatriation risks becoming a numbers exercise rather than a durable solution.

Bangladesh cannot carry the burden indefinitely

Bangladesh has already carried a substantial humanitarian and economic burden. International support for refugees must therefore continue, but the burden on host communities must also receive greater attention. The people of Cox’s Bazar and surrounding areas should not feel that they have been forgotten while international attention remains focused exclusively on the refugee population.

Development assistance should therefore address both refugees and host communities. Infrastructure, healthcare, education, employment opportunities and environmental protection require sustained investment. This is not about placing refugees and local residents against each other. It is about recognising that long-term stability depends on supporting both communities.

The next generation is at stake

Perhaps the most serious long-term concern is the future of Rohingya children and young people. A generation is growing up in an environment defined by displacement and uncertainty. Without adequate education, skills and hope for a better future, prolonged marginalisation can create frustration and vulnerability to exploitation by criminal or armed groups.

Education and skills development must therefore remain central to the humanitarian response. Providing young Rohingya with opportunities is not simply an act of charity; it is also an investment in regional stability.

At the same time, Bangladesh must strengthen the security and governance of the camps without turning them into permanent detention-like environments. Humanitarian protection and security are not mutually exclusive. In fact, effective humanitarian management can itself reduce security risks.

Bangladesh needs a stronger diplomatic strategy

Bangladesh now needs to move beyond crisis management towards a more comprehensive diplomatic strategy. The country should pursue three objectives simultaneously: protecting the humanitarian rights of the Rohingya, safeguarding Bangladesh’s national security, and creating sustained international pressure for safe and dignified repatriation.

These objectives should not be treated as competing priorities. They are interconnected parts of the same solution. Bangladesh should also ensure that the Rohingya issue remains on the international agenda. Global attention tends to shift as new conflicts and crises emerge. But the absence of headlines does not mean the crisis has disappeared.

Diplomatic engagement must therefore be continuous, coordinated and evidence-based. Bangladesh has a strong moral and legal argument for seeking international support. But moral appeals alone are not enough. Dhaka needs a clear strategy, measurable diplomatic objectives and stronger coordination with countries that have influence over Myanmar.

Relief must continue—but it cannot be the destination

The international community should not mistake the relative stability of the refugee camps for resolution of the crisis. A camp can provide temporary shelter. It cannot replace a homeland. Humanitarian assistance can save lives. It cannot resolve statelessness. International funding can sustain basic services. It cannot guarantee a political settlement. That is why the international response must evolve from relief diplomacy to solution-oriented diplomacy.

Bangladesh should continue providing humanitarian protection, but it should also make clear that the country cannot be expected to carry the consequences of a crisis it did not create indefinitely. The Rohingya crisis has reached a point where humanitarian responsibility and national security must be addressed together. Ignoring either dimension would be a mistake.

Bangladesh needs stronger border security, better camp management and tougher action against criminal networks. But it also needs sustained international diplomacy aimed at changing the conditions that made mass displacement possible in the first place.

The ultimate solution lies not in making refugee camps more permanent, but in making return possible. The Rohingya crisis will not be solved by relief alone. It will be solved when diplomacy produces the conditions for a safe, voluntary and dignified return.

For Bangladesh, the message should now be clear: aid must continue, but the goal must be a solution. The Rohingya crisis cannot remain a permanent humanitarian burden when what is urgently needed is a lasting political and diplomatic settlement.

Shibbir Ahmed: The greatest asset of an independent nation is its children. Today’s children are not merely the sons and daughters of individual families—they are tomorrow’s citizens, workforce, leaders, and the future of the state. The dreams that take shape in a child’s eyes are, in many ways, the first sketches of a nation’s future.

But when those very children begin disappearing one after another, the question is no longer limited to an individual family. It becomes a question of national security, social responsibility, and our collective conscience.

In Bangladesh, the growing number of general diaries, or G.D.s, filed over missing children has recently created renewed concern. According to data from Police Headquarters cited in recent reports, 15,917 G.D.s concerning missing children were filed across the country during the first seven months of 2026. That works out to an average of more than 75 reports a day, or roughly one missing-child report every 20 to 21 minutes.

The figure is undoubtedly alarming. But one important distinction must be made: **15,917 is the number of missing-child-related G.D.s, not the number of children who are necessarily still missing.** It would be wrong to interpret the figure as proof that 15,917 children remain missing.

Government and police officials have acknowledged that a G.D. does not necessarily tell us the final outcome of a case. Many children return home after going missing, but their families may not go back to the police station to report the child’s return or formally update the original G.D. As a result, a missing-child case may remain in police records even after the child has returned home. Recent reporting has also highlighted the absence of a regularly published, consolidated national record showing how many children were rescued, returned home, remained missing, or became victims of other crimes. And this is where the deepest part of the crisis lies.

The more important question is not simply how many children have gone missing—but how many have returned, and how many have not?

If the state does not have an accurate, coordinated and regularly updated answer to that question, then the true picture of the missing-child crisis remains unclear. And when a crisis cannot be accurately measured, it becomes extremely difficult to design an effective national strategy to confront it.

A child who disappears leaves behind a family whose suffering cannot be measured by statistics. A mother stands outside a police station holding a photograph of her child. A father searches street after street. Every unfamiliar phone call becomes a moment of hope—and sometimes a source of unbearable fear. The slightest sound at the door can make a parent think: perhaps my child has finally come home. Days pass. Nights pass. The waiting remains. There is no statistic capable of measuring such waiting.

Does Missing Always Mean Abduction?

Every missing-child case is not the same. A child may become separated from family members in a crowded fair, shopping center, railway station or bus terminal. A teenager may leave home voluntarily because of family conflict, hurt feelings, misunderstanding or excessive discipline. In other cases, however, serious crimes such as abduction or trafficking may be involved.

Therefore, it would be wrong to place every missing-child case in the same category. But it would be equally dangerous to dismiss a case as ordinary at the outset.

When a child moves beyond the immediate control of the family, the first few hours can be critical. Information about where the child went, whom the child contacted, which route the child took, or who may have come into contact with the child needs to be collected and analyzed as quickly as possible.

Technology can be one of the state’s most powerful tools in this effort. CCTV footage, mobile communication data, digital investigation, transportation surveillance, and the coordinated use of government databases can significantly improve the chances of locating a missing child. But technology can only be effective when information is connected.

Bangladesh has already taken a step in this direction. Police launched **MUN Alert—Missing Urgent Notification—on January 13, 2026**, to help identify and recover missing or abducted children more quickly. The system allows cases to be reported around the clock and facilitates the rapid dissemination of information, including a child’s photograph and last known location. Police have said the system is intended to verify reports, assess risk and issue emergency alerts when necessary. However, it has not yet been fully integrated with the missing-child information maintained at individual police stations. That gap must be closed.

The Dark World of Trafficking

One of the most frightening possibilities surrounding missing children is human trafficking. Bangladesh has long faced serious trafficking risks, and women and children remain particularly vulnerable. The U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons reporting has documented trafficking investigations and continuing challenges in Bangladesh, while UNICEF has highlighted the country’s position as a source, transit and destination country for trafficking in women and children.

Poverty, family instability, social vulnerability, child marriage, unsafe migration and displacement can all increase a child’s exposure to exploitation. A trafficker does not always need an elaborate scheme to lure a child. A mobile phone, a small amount of money, a promise of employment, food, or even the trust of a familiar person can become the beginning of a trap.

And once a child falls under the control of a criminal network, finding that child can become far more difficult. But there is another important point that must not be ignored: missing does not automatically mean trafficking.

Police have said there is currently no evidence establishing a direct link between all of the 15,917 missing-child-related G.D.s and child trafficking. At the same time, the possibility of trafficking cannot simply be dismissed in individual cases.

This distinction matters. If we label every missing child a trafficking victim without evidence, we distort the facts. But if we fail to investigate trafficking as a possible explanation in appropriate cases, we may allow serious crimes to disappear behind incomplete records.

Child trafficking is not merely a story about crossing international borders. Children can also face different forms of exploitation within the country itself. Therefore, missing-child cases should not be viewed merely as isolated law-and-order incidents. They must also be examined in the broader context of human trafficking, child labor, sexual exploitation, organized begging and other forms of criminal exploitation.

The Greatest Weakness—Fragmented Information

One of the most urgent steps Bangladesh needs is a genuinely integrated national information system for missing children. The moment a child is reported missing, essential information—including the child’s name, age, photograph, physical description, last known location, clothing, family contact information and circumstances surrounding the disappearance—should be securely recorded in a centralized system.

When the child is found or returns home, that information should be updated immediately in the same system. Police, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Police Bureau of Investigation, Border Guard Bangladesh, hospitals, morgues, social services and other relevant child-protection institutions should have an effective mechanism for sharing appropriate information.

This is not merely a technological issue. It is an issue of governance. A missing-child case should have a beginning, a middle and an end. It should not simply become a G.D. number sitting in a police register.

The final outcome should be recorded—whether the child was rescued, returned home independently, found elsewhere, abducted, identified as a trafficking victim, or remains missing. Experts have specifically called for such an outcome-based system, including better coordination among police records, hospitals, morgues and other relevant institutions.

At the same time, children’s privacy and personal information must be protected. Technology should be used to find a missing child—not to expose that child to another danger. A system designed to protect children must therefore include strong safeguards for their identity and personal data.

Faster Alerts, Faster Rescue

Bangladesh needs an even stronger mechanism for rapidly alerting the public when a child goes missing. Several countries use emergency child-alert systems that can quickly distribute a missing child’s photograph and identifying information to large numbers of people when authorities determine that an emergency alert is warranted.

Bangladesh has already begun moving in that direction through MUN Alert. The next step should be to make the system broader, faster and better integrated with existing police, child-protection and emergency-response mechanisms.

A missing child’s photograph circulating on social media should not depend solely on the desperate efforts of family members. Wherever appropriate, verified information should become part of a coordinated official response.

The media also has an important role to play. But that role must be exercised responsibly. Publishing a child’s photograph, identity or family information must never expose the child to further danger. News organizations need clear guidelines to ensure that efforts to locate a child do not compromise the child’s safety, dignity or future.

Families Cannot Escape Responsibility Either

The state carries the greatest responsibility—but families and society also have important roles to play. In crowded fairs, markets, railway stations, bus terminals or large public gatherings, young children should never be allowed to disappear from their guardians’ sight, even for a moment. Children should have access to emergency contact information and should receive age-appropriate safety education.

For adolescents, however, safety means more than supervision. It also means communication. Why does a teenager want to leave home? Why does he or she feel afraid to speak with parents? Why can a young person not share personal problems with family members? These questions must be addressed.

Only discipline cannot keep a child safe. Trust, friendship, communication and emotional support are also essential parts of child safety.

The State Must Know Who Came Home—and Who Did Not

One of the most important reforms Bangladesh can undertake is the establishment of a complete missing-to-recovery information cycle. A GD is the beginning. It cannot be the end. After a child goes missing, the system should record the progress of the search, the actions taken by investigators, whether the child has been found, how the child was found and, where necessary, what protection, counseling or rehabilitation was provided afterward.

Such a system would not only improve statistical transparency. It would also make it possible to identify where children are most frequently reported missing, which age groups are most vulnerable, which regions face greater risks and what circumstances repeatedly appear in these cases.

There is another issue that cannot be ignored: unidentified bodies. If a missing child’s body is later recovered but the identity cannot be established, and there is no effective system linking missing-child records with unidentified-body records from hospitals and morgues, a family’s search may remain unresolved for years. Experts have therefore called for compatible databases and a national-level matching mechanism. Then the state would not merely count numbers. It would see the human beings behind those numbers.

The Ultimate Measure of Development Is the Safety of Children

A nation’s development cannot be measured simply by the number of bridges, roads, flyovers, skyscrapers or the size of its GDP. One important measure of how developed a state truly is lies in how safely it can raise its children. For a mother who cannot send her child to school without fear, for a father who remains anxious every moment his child is away from home, or for a family that spends day after day waiting for reliable information after a child disappears—the meaning of development is different.

For them, development means their child will return home before evening. Development means hearing a familiar little hand knock on the door after school. Development means never having to stand outside a police station holding a photograph of their child. The figure of 15,917 missing-child-related G.D.s is alarming enough to demand our attention. But more than alarming us, it should force us to ask harder questions.

Because behind every G.D. is the possibility of a child in distress, a family in anguish, a story that remains unfinished and a future placed at risk. We must not limit the discussion to numbers.

We must ask How many children have returned? How many have not? Where did they disappear? Why did they disappear? And, most importantly— How prepared is the state to bring them home? Protecting Bangladesh’s future generation is not an act of charity. It is a fundamental responsibility of the state. A child who goes missing is not merely someone’s son or daughter. That child belongs to Bangladesh.

Protecting that child’s safe childhood means protecting the future of Bangladesh. Our children must never become mere statistics of disappearance. They must return to their homes, reclaim their childhoods, and allow Bangladesh to reclaim its future.

—The author is a journalist based in Jackson Heights, New York.

Mashiur Rahman Majumdar: Whenever the issue of Bangladeshi expatriates comes up, the discussion usually begins with remittances. Yet an expatriate is not merely someone who sends foreign currency home. He or she is a Bangladeshi citizen. Even while living abroad, an expatriate has the right to citizenship, the right to receive government services and the right to seek state assistance when necessary. It is from this perspective that passport, National Identity Card (NID) and other consular services for expatriate Bangladeshis should be viewed.

In recent times, the government has emphasized making passport and NID services for expatriates faster, easier, more transparent and technology-driven. Foreign Minister Dr Khalilur Rahman has said in Parliament that Bangladeshi missions where e-passport services have been introduced provide online applications, biometric enrolment at convenient times and facilities to track application progress. Applicants are also notified by SMS or email when their passports are ready. These are undoubtedly positive initiatives. But the question is: Is launching a service the same as making that service genuinely accessible?

At present, voter registration and NID services are available through 27 Bangladeshi missions in 17 countries. The government plans to gradually expand these services to 41 countries. This means that although important steps have been taken, NID-related services are still not equally accessible to Bangladeshis living in every part of the world.

The same question arises in the case of passports. When the passport of a Bangladeshi living abroad expires, the person has to depend on the relevant embassy or consulate. Although applications can be submitted online, applicants still have to appear at the mission at a designated time for biometric enrolment. The passport itself is issued by the Department of Immigration and Passports in Dhaka. Therefore, if coordination between overseas missions and the relevant authorities in Bangladesh is not effective, the waiting time for applicants may increase.

Let us take the United States as an example. According to the current information provided by the Bangladesh Consulate General in New York, applicants can apply online for e-passports, pay the required fees, schedule appointments and complete biometric enrolment. The necessary documents are also clearly listed. Similarly, an online application and appointment system is available for NID services.

This is an important step toward digital public services. But from an expatriate’s perspective, the quality of a service cannot be measured simply by whether an online application system exists. The real question is: How fast, accurate, predictable and hassle-free is the entire process from application to service delivery?

If an expatriate has to repeatedly visit an embassy or consulate after applying online to correct information, verify documents, complete biometric procedures, collect a passport or resolve an NID-related problem, then questions will inevitably remain about how much of the original purpose of digital services has actually been achieved.

Another important issue is coordination among government agencies. Passport, NID, birth registration, visa services and document authentication often involve multiple government institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that, under its action plan for the 2026-27 fiscal year, steps are being taken to establish an online system involving relevant agencies to make verification of passport, visa and birth and death registration information easier.

This is where the next major test of digital public services lies. Simply introducing online forms does not make a service fully digital. What is needed is interoperability among government agencies, faster verification, a system that prevents citizens from repeatedly submitting the same information, and clear accountability for applicants.

The same reality applies to NID services. An identity card is an extremely important document for any citizen. It may be required for voter registration, banking, property-related matters, government services and various administrative procedures when returning to Bangladesh. If an expatriate finds an error in their NID or needs to correct personal information, the process for resolving the issue should also be made as simple as possible.

Distance is another major challenge for expatriates seeking government services. Not all expatriates live near capitals or major cities. In many countries, Bangladeshi citizens are spread across vast geographical areas, sometimes hundreds of miles away from their nearest embassy or consulate. Mobile consular camps can therefore be an effective solution.

Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman has said that 86 Bangladeshi missions in 63 countries regularly organize mobile consular camps. These camps provide passport and other consular services and bring services closer to expatriates living far from embassies and consulates. The locations, dates and times of such camps are announced in advance.

This initiative should be expanded and organized more regularly. Particularly in countries with large Bangladeshi communities spread across wide geographical areas, a fixed annual calendar for mobile consular services could save expatriates both time and money.

But providing services alone is not enough. Prompt resolution of complaints is equally important. The government has said that online complaint management systems are in place at Bangladeshi missions and that plans are underway to appoint designated officials to ensure complaints are resolved quickly.

This raises several important questions. How long should an expatriate have to wait for a response after filing a complaint? How will the applicant track the progress of the complaint? If an application is stuck at a government office, who will inform the applicant? And if a service is not delivered within the stipulated time, to whom can the citizen hold the authorities accountable?

Improving expatriate services requires institutional answers to these questions. When an expatriate wants to renew a passport, obtain an NID or authenticate a document, they are not asking for special treatment. They are seeking government services as a matter of their citizenship rights.

Therefore, expatriate services cannot be treated merely as an administrative responsibility. They must be viewed as part of citizens’ rights and the state’s responsibility. Even while living abroad, Bangladeshi citizens maintain an administrative and civic relationship with their country. The easier, more transparent and more reliable that relationship becomes, the stronger their trust in the state will be.

A change in mindset is also necessary. Expatriates should not be viewed merely as people who send remittances. They are contributors to the national economy, potential investors, responsible members of families and representatives of Bangladesh on foreign soil.

That is why even a minor administrative complication involving passport or NID services can become a major burden for an expatriate. Travelling long distances to an embassy, taking time off from work, spending money on transportation or repeatedly contacting authorities to resolve a simple problem all carry real costs for expatriates.

The government’s recent initiatives must therefore translate into tangible results. Online applications, biometric enrolment, application tracking, e-apostille, online complaint management and mobile consular camps should all be brought under an integrated service framework.

Most importantly, the quality of services should be measured from the perspective of expatriates’ actual experiences. The number of applications received is less important than the number of applications resolved on time. The number of missions offering a service is less important than how many citizens can actually access that service easily.

If passport and NID services for expatriates can truly be made faster, easier, more transparent and technology-driven, it will be more than an administrative reform. It will strengthen the relationship between the state and its citizens abroad.

Expatriates send money home for the country. But the state needs more than their money—it needs their trust. And trust is built not through promises, but through effective services. It is therefore time to ask the question more directly: How far have we actually progressed in providing passport and NID services to expatriates, and how much of what has been promised has reached them in reality?

The answer is important not only for the government but for every level of the state service system. An expatriate’s money is an asset to the country, but an expatriate’s trust is an equally valuable national asset. Protecting that trust requires not only promises but also meaningful improvements in the quality of services delivered to Bangladeshis living abroad.

— Journalist, Jackson Heights, New York